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How does the separation of ownership and control affect
corporate performance: the impact of earnings management in
China
Yuqing Zhu, Gary Gang Tian1, and Shan Zhao

School of Accounting and Finance, University of Wollongong

Abstract
This paper examines the impact of disproportional ownership on true firm performance when
firm performance is adjusted for the effect of earnings management. Results from regression
analysis indicate that the separation between control and cash flow rights of family/or
individual-controlled listed firms in China decreases firm performance when firm
performance is adjusted for the effect of earnings management than when firm performance is
measured as reported performance. The results also show that separation is significantly
positively related with true firm performance in firms with low cash flow rights concentration.
The main disproportional ownership mechanism, pyramidal structures is also investigated in
the paper. We find that pyramidal structure substantially increases earnings management and
hence reduces true performance while it constrains earnings management significantly in low
cash flow concentrated firms. Adjusting for the impact of earnings management substantially
increases the measured importance of disproportional ownership structures of controlling
shareholder on firm performance.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine the effect of disproportional ownership structure on
corporate performance with an explicit control for earnings management. Specifically,
we use accrual-adjusted performance instead of raw performance following Cornett et
al. (2008). In particular, we explore the effect of separation in control and ownership
of China’s family-controlled or individual-controlled listed firms on earnings
management and test whether the measured importance of ownership variables is
increased when true performance is used. This is an issue not hitherto examined by
prior studies conducted in countries such as the United States and the United
Kingdom where the ownership structure is dispersed and the conflicting interests of
shareholders and managers are a major agency problem.
In many countries, especially Asian countries in the world, where concentrated
ownership is prevalent, agency problems mainly arise from the agency conflicts
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Extant literature (e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) has investigated that ownership structure can significantly
influence both corporate performance and earnings management. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) argue that controlling shareholders are likely to appropriate firm resources as
control-cash flow rights difference increases. In other words, conflicting interests
among shareholders might lower firm performance.
Recent research measures the agency problems by the divergence between the
ultimate owner’s cash flow rights and control rights. Ever since then, their
methodology of agency problems measurement has been used extensively. For
example, Classens et al. (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) use this methodology to
examine the impact of agency problems on firm value in emerging economies. They
conclude that in general, the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ cash
flow rights and control rights has negative and significant impact on firm value,
measuring in Tobin’s q and stock market returns. However, it is not obvious whether
the separation of control rights from cash flow rights affects operating performance.
For example, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2009) show that disproportional ownership
structures reduce firm value but do not affect firm performance and hence argue that
disproportional ownership does not lead to less efficiently used corporate resources
from European large firms.
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Furthermore, Lemmon and Lins (2003) pointed out that ownership structure plays a
key role in determining the expropriation on minority shareholders, which is also
related with earnings management activities. That is, when controlling shareholders’
disproportional ownership affects both firm performance and earnings management,
the true effects of ownership structure on firm performance after adjusting the impact
of earnings management might change as well. For example, the research of Black
(2001), Black et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2003) shows a significant effect of
corporate governance variables on firm performance. Cornett et al. (2008) point out
that the impact of corporate governance on firm performance changes when the true
firm performance is measured. Cornett et al. (2008) further argue that if both earnings
management and corporate performance are likewise impacted by governance
mechanisms then the influence of these governance mechanisms on reported firm
performance is probably partly cosmetic.
These studies on ownership structure share one common feature. They all regress
Tobin’s q or market-to-book ratio as proxies for firm value or firm performance on
measures of the separation between control and cash flow rights. However, these
studies fail to properly identify true firm performance which is adjusted for the effects
of earnings management.
China has become the second-largest economy in the world following US in 2006
based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (CIA, 2007). In terms of the report from the
Economist (2008), China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 11.4% on
average at yearly base to 24.66 trillion yuans (or approximately 3.43 trillion US
dollars) in 2007. China, a large and emerging economy with a specific institutional
background, now provides a good example for us to investigate the true impact of
ownership variables on firm performance adjusting for earnings management effects.
China servers as an interesting setting for the current study for the following reasons.
First, institutional investors are believed to play an important role in western countries
(Chung et al., 2002) while they basically hold a small amount of shares in Chinese
listed firms and thus cannot play any important role in monitoring management.
Therefore, controlling shareholders are believed to determine firm performance in
many respects and hence we can focus on the impact of disproportional ownership in
China’s listed firms.
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Secondly, because China’s listed firms have a highly concentrated ownership
structure mostly dominating by a large shareholder, a key agency problem with a
concentrated ownership structure is the expropriation of minority shareholders by
controlling shareholders. This kind of agency issue is even more acute in china due to
the specific ownership feature that controlling shareholders hold non-tradable and
tradable shares while minority shareholders only own tradable shares. That is, in
response to the divergence between non-tradable and tradable shares, the conflicting
interests of controlling and minority shareholders have long been recognized as the
source of substantial agency problems in China such as tunnelling. Thus, managers
and directors of listed firms incline to manage earnings for controlling shareholders’
interests rather than their own entrenchment.
Moreover, while shares are mostly widely held in US and the number of pyramidal
structures is small, China’ listed firms are featured with highly-concentrated
ownership, and family/or individual-controlled firms are mostly pyramidal structures.
Maury (2006) suggests that family control mitigates the agency problem between
shareholders and managers, but increases the conflicts of interests between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders when shareholder protection is weak and
control is high, which is exactly the case of China. Thus, family/or individualcontrolled firms from China’s listed corporations based on a seven-year panel data set
are used to investigate the impact of agency problem.
A simple analysis on the relation between divergence and operating performance can
be problematic if we do not consider earning management. As shown in Haw et al.
(2004), earnings management is substantially increased by the divergence between
control and cash flow rights by using data from 9 East Asian and 13 Western
European countries.
This study empirically examines the relation between disproportional ownership of
controlling shareholders and firm performance after taking account of the effect of
earnings management. We find that the separation of control and cash flow rights
significantly increases earnings management only when the cash flow rights is highly
concentrated. We also find that separation can restrain earnings management in firms
with lower cash flow right concentration and hence boost true firm performance when
the effect of earnings management is excluded. In terms of control-enhancing

mechanisms (which deviates from one share-one vote) such as pyramids and crossholdings structure, we find that pyramidal structure dramatically increases earnings
management and decreases true performance. Furthermore, in firms with lower cash
flow concentration, pyramids are likely to weaken earnings management and thus
enhance true corporate performance. Consequently, adjusting for the impact of
earnings

management

substantially increases

the measured importance of

disproportional ownership structures of controlling shareholder on firm performance.
The paper proceeds in five sections. The next section reviews the literature on
ownership structure and earnings management. Section 3 introduces the data used in
our study, presents the models to identify earnings management, and discusses the
empirical approach. Section 4 presents empirical results and further robustness tests.
A final section concludes.
2. Separation of control and ownership and earnings management
2.1 Earnings management
It’s recognized for years in accounting and finance literature that managers use the
latitude in accounting rules to manage accounting numbers and to serve their own or
the firm’s interests in a wide variety of contexts (see, for example, Chen and Yuan,
2004). In Healy and Wahlen (1999)’s review article, they conclude that the evidence
is consistent with earnings management “to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. ” They
also points out that if financial reports are used to convey managers’ information on
their firms’ performance, managers must be allowed to exercise judgment in financial
reporting. However, management’s discretion on judgment may lead to earnings
management, under certain circumstances, even fraud.
China’s stock market is under a weak legal context which provides little protection for
minority shareholders. There were increasingly outbreaks of corporate scandals in
China’s listed firms during the early 2000s.

Likewise, the interests of minority

shareholders were infringed by the controlling shareholders to a large extent.
In prior literature, Klein (2002), Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) all find that
earnings management can be restrained by well-designed corporate governance

structures. For instance, Bedard et al. (2004) suggest that the proportion of
independent directors on board of directors decreases the magnitude of earnings
management.
2.2 Ownership structure
2.2.1 Separation of control and ownership
La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) provided
evidence that controlling shareholders of publicly listed firms in most countries have
substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. In Chinese listed firms,
one major owner usually holds a substantial percentage of shareholdings. When
controlling shareholders have control in excess of their cash flow rights, they incline
to expropriate minority shareholders by seeking personal benefits. Supporting this
view, Claessens et al. (2002) examined the impact of disproportional ownership on
market value of equity across countries and found that cash flow rights of the largest
shareholder is positively related to market-to-book ratio whilst the separation between
control and cash flow rights is negatively related to market-to-book ratio. On the other
hand, opposite evidence was provided, showing that omitted variable problems may
affect the results. For example, La Porta et al. (2002) point out that the difference
between control and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder is not significantly
associated with Tobin’s q when country-wide indices of investor protection is
involved in their models. Likewise, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) used fixed effects
regression models from a panel of Swedish firms over 1991-1997 and did not find
significant relationship between the difference in control and cash flow rights and
firm value. However, it is not obvious whether the divergence affects operating
performance. For example, Joh (2003) documented that a high difference between
control and cash flow rights shows low firm profitability from 5,829 Korean firms
during 1993-1997 while Bennedsen and Nielsen (2009) showed that separation
reduces firm value but does not affect firm performance
Moreover, in light of the specific non-tradable shares in China’s listed firms, large
non-tradable shareholders typically have different interests from those of minority
shareholders. In other words, the interests of non-tradable shareholders are not
directly influenced by market share price due to the non-tradability of non-tradable
shares. Consequently, concentrated ownership structure provides controlling

shareholders potential to make company decisions and hence expropriate minority
shareholders to their own benefits (Zou et al., 2008).
In addition, ownership structure, more specifically, divergence between control and
cash flow rights, affects the monitoring mechanisms a firm uses and hence influences
the monitoring of earnings management activity. Evidence provided from Asian
countries, Chen et al. (2010) employed data from Taiwan to show that high-growth
firms with a high control-cash flow rights’ separation are more likely to engage in
earnings management. Thus, we predict that the earnings management is high when
the difference between control and cash flow rights is high and hence the true firm
performance is low after adjusting the effects of earnings management.
The magnitude of earnings management is affected both by the incentives and the
opportunity of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) suggest that because private benefits of controlling shareholders
are determined by its cash flow rights, cash flow rights can increase the controlling
shareholders to pay out dividends (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000). Thus, lower cash flow
concentration weakens the controlling shareholders’ motivation for managing
earnings since they have less cash flow incentives. Described above, when controlling
shareholders’ control rights exceed their cash flow rights they are more likely to
expropriate firm resources. More specifically, expropriation is more likely to occur
when the difference between control and cash flow rights is large and when their
position is secure (Joh, 2003). Combined together, we expect that controlling
shareholders with large separation of control from cash flow rights decline to manage
earnings when their position is unsecure, that is, when the cash flow concentration is
low.
2.2.2 Control-enhancing mechanisms
Under “one share-one vote” there is no separation between control and cash flow
rights. Therefore, disproportional ownership is referred to as the deviations from one
share-one vote and hence as the use of mechanisms to separate control rights from
cash flow rights in firms. Shareholders typically use several explicit mechanisms (i.e.,
control-enhancing mechanisms) to acquire control with less proportional economic
interests in corporations, e.g., stock pyramids and cross-ownership. Controlling

shareholders build pyramids by controlling firms “through a chain of companies”,
which is another form of separating ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1999).
Deviations from “one share-one vote” are found all over the world. Dual-class shares
are proved to be rare in Eastern Asian countries while pyramids and cross-ownership
structures are common (Claessens et al., 2000). Claessens et al (2002) further identify
that most of the deviations from “one share-one vote” occur due to pyramidal control.
Bennedsen and Nielsen (2007) examined the effects of disproportional ownership on
firm value for a large sample in 14 Western European countries. They found that
disproportional ownership caused by pyramids is the second most detrimental to firm
value, following dual-class shares while other control-enhancing mechanisms do not
have significant impact on firm value.

However, Villalonga and Amit (2006)

investigated the effects of control-enhancing mechanisms including dual-class, voting
agreements, pyramids and others by using US data. Their results suggest that control
via pyramids do not affect firm value when control is measured as the separation from
cash flow rights.
Controlling shareholders have control rights in excess of their cash flow rights,
mainly through the use of pyramids as well as participating in management. The
power of these controlling shareholders is obviously not under supervision of other
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Thus, we expect more expropriation of the
minority shareholders and hence more earnings management in firms with pyramidal
structures. However, lower cash flow concentration provides the controlling
shareholders less incentives to manage earnings. For example, Nguyen and Xu (2010)
found that within the sample of firms with dual class structure, the divergence
between control and cash flow rights is negatively related with earnings management.
Furthermore, dual-class structure creates a high difference between control and cash
flow rights, which provides controlling shareholders a majority of control rights
despite of their smaller residual claims. Moreover, the concentrated control rights can
effectively reduce the likelihood of displacing management in a hostile takeover. Thus,
managers will have less incentive to manage earnings when they do not need to worry
about dismissal. In addition, the smaller cash flow rights will also reduce the possible
private benefits from earnings management activities (Nguyen and Xu, 2010).

Therefore, we also expect lower earnings management in firms with pyramidal
structure and lower cash flow concentration.
3. Data and models
3.1 Sample
Prior research finds that earnings management is more prevalent in poorly performing
firms (e.g., Kothari et al., 2005) and when applied to firms with extreme corporate
performance the standard models of discretionary accruals may not be reliable
(Dechow et al., 1995). Here, following Cornett et al. (2008), we look at factors
affecting earnings management in “normal” times when even good performing firms
are influenced. That is, firms which received special treatment (ST) 2 during the
sample window are deleted. Thus, here the potential limitations of empirical
discretionary accruals models can be ignored in this study because the sample of firms
is free of financial distress. The study of Claessens et al. (2000) showed that the
separation of cash-flow and control rights is most pronounced in family-controlled
firms and small firms. Therefore, our research focuses on family-controlled and
individual-controlled firms.
Specifically, we constructed the dataset by merging the following two separate
databases. First, we used accounting and other corporate governance data from the
database developed by SinoFin Information Services3. Second, we assembled familycontrolled and individual-controlled data from China Stock Market and Accounting
Research Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology
Company.
We then exclude all financial firms 4 because they are subject to fundamentally
different regulatory regimes and internal governance structures. Due to data
availability of cash flow rights and control rights of ultimate controller, the final
2

CSRC released the Special Treatment (ST) regulation in 1998 that firms are specially treated if they
make losses for two successive years.
3

Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example,
see, Kato and Long, 2006.
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Our industry classification follows Chen et al. (2006), listed Chinese firms are classified to 6
industries: Finance, Utilities, Property and Construction, Conglomerates, Industrial and Manufactory,
Commercial.

sample consists of data on 5 non-financial industries during the time periods from
2003 to 2009.
We then delete observations without the availability of ownership structure, and
accounting and financial data that this study needs. After these adjustments, we are
left with a sample of 1775 firm-years over sample period 2003-2009. In our
regressions, unlike the study of Cornett et al. (2008), the variables of the economic
determinants of firm performance and earnings management are contemporary5. Table
1 defines all the variables in our panel regression analysis.
(Insert Table 1 here)
3.2 Discretionary accruals
Dechow et al. (1995) claim the so-called “modified Jones (1991) model” as the model
that provides the most power for detecting earnings management after they compare
several models of discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2001) advocate
the use of the modified Jones model when it is estimated cross-sectional using other
firms in the same industry. Most models of discretionary accruals refer to
discretionary accruals as the difference between actual and “normal” accruals,
estimated by a regression formula. Firstly, the modified Jones model estimates normal
accruals as a fraction of lagged assets from the following equation:
TA jt
Assets jt 1

Where TA jt

 0

1
Assets jt 1

 1

Salesjt
Assets jt 1

 2

PPE jt
Assets jt 1

(1)

is total accruals for firm j in year t. Total accruals are calculated as

earnings before interests and tax (EBIT)6. Assets jt is total assets for firm j in year t,

Sales jt is change in sales for firm j in year t, and PPE jt is property, plant, equipment
for firm j in year t.
In response to the research of Hribar and Collins (2002), compared with balance sheet,
cash flow statement is preferred in computing total accruals when there are events
5

As a sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses with lagged performance measurements and receive
similar results.
6

EBIT is not required to be reported in income statement of China’s listed firms. Therefore, we employ
operating income as proxy for EBIT.

such as mergers and acquisitions which change balance sheet but not income
statement. Following Cornett et al. (2008), we also compute total accruals as
operating income (proxy for earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations) minus operating cash flows from continuing operations. Discretionary
accruals as a portion of the book value of assets, %DA, are calculated as:

%DA 

TA jt
Assets jt 1

 (ˆ 0

1
Assets jt 1

Salesjt   Re ceivables jt
 ˆ1
 ˆ2
Assets jt 1

PPE jt
Assets jt 1

)

(2)

Where hats refer to as estimated values from regression Eq.1. Modified Jones model
adds  Re ceivables jt , which attempts to identify the amounts of aggressive
recognition of questionable sales in sales changes, to the original Jones model.
Following prior research on earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon,
2006), the value of discretionary accruals is normally used as a proxy for the
magnitude of earnings management. We run fixed effects regressions in the sample
period when the results of regressions will be discussed in detail in later section.
To investigate the effects of ownership structure and other corporate governance
factors on earnings management, we use the model as follows when we control the
firm-specific characteristics:

% DA   0  1SEPARATION   2CASHRIGHT   3 DUAL
  4 BOARDIND   5 LBOARDSIZE   6 LOSS   7 LASSETS   8 LEV   it

(3)

In Table 2, we present summary statistics concerning board composition, ownership
structure, and firm-specific measures for family-controlled and individual-controlled
firms. Like the studies of Claessens et al. (2000), we measured the ownership
structure in terms of cash flow rights and control rights and hence computed
separation, the divergence between control and cash flow rights. We therefore
carefully followed the chain of ownership and used pyramiding structures and crossholdings to distinguish between control rights and cash flow rights. We defined the
ultimate owner as the state with the largest control rights 7 when summing direct and
indirect ownership (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005).

7

Following La Porta et al. (1999), I classify the largest shareholder with summing direct and indirect
ownership as the ultimate owner. Take a look at the ownership structure in China’s listed firms, a
singular ultimate owner mostly likely presents.

(Insert Table 2 here)
Panel A in Table 2 presents measures of cash-flow and control rights for the sample.
Cash-flow rights (CASHRIGHT) is defined as the cash flow rights of the largest
shareholder. Control rights (CONTROL) is defined as the voting rights of the largest
shareholder. SEPARATION is defined as control rights less cash-flow rights, and
DSEP is a dummy variable indicating whether the SEPARATION is greater than zero.
Low cash-flow concentration (LCFC) is also a dummy variable that equals one when
cash-flow rights is smaller than median cash-flow rights of full sample. Like
ownership patterns in many other countries, ownership is concentrated and the largest
shareholder mostly has control rights in excess of cash flow rights. Average cash flow
rights in the sample is 23.1% while average control rights is 33.4%. The difference
results in separation of 10.2% and 77.8% observations in our sample have control
rights in excess of cash flow rights. In terms of different control-enhancing
mechanisms in ownership disproportional sample, pyramids dominate 69% of full
sample, compared to cross-holdings and other mechanisms.
3.3 Firm performance
In order to investigate the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance, we
measure the reported firm performance as ROA, net income/assets, mostly used in
prior research as measurement of firm performance. However, as a result of
managers’ influence over accruals (for example, accounts receivable) as well as the
treatment of amortization, ROA is likely to be manipulated by CEO (Dechow et al.,
1996). In order to measure true firm performance without management manipulation,
we use the difference between ROA and %DA as proxy for unmanaged true
performance. Therefore, exclusion of discretionary components makes this firm
performance a more true performance compared with reported ROA, which might be
cosmetic due to management discretion in accounting treatment.
Two measurements of firm performance were reported in Table 2, Panel B: ROA and
ROA-%DA. The average ROA based on reported earnings is 4.71%, and the mean
performance measurement based on unmanaged true earnings (i.e., the effect of
discretionary accruals on reported performance is removed) is 3.3%.

Then we investigate whether industry adjustment makes any difference in firm
performance. For each firm, we identify industry comparison firms as all firms listed
on stock exchanges within the same industry8. Industry-adjusted performance is the
firm’s performance in any year minus the average industry value for that year. We
measure firm performance alternatively as reported ROA, net income/Assets, or true
performance adjusted for discretionary accruals, (net income/Assets)-%DA. Industry
adjusted performance is zero either by using net income/assets or by using (net
income/assets)-%DA
To compare the results between reported performance and true performance, we use
following regression analyses when firm characteristics are controlled:

NETINCOME / ASSETS   0  1SEPARATION   2CASHRIGHT   3 DUAL
  4 BOARDIND   5 LBOARDSIZE   6 LOSS   7 LASSETS   8 LEV   it
(4)
Where NETINCOME/ASSETS is referred to as reported ROA in the paper and other
variables are defined in Table 1.

NETINCOME / ASSETS  % DA   0  1SEPARATION   2CASHRIGHT   3 DUAL
  4 BOARDIND   5 LBOARDSIZE   6 LOSS   7 LASSETS   8 LEV   it

(5)
Where (NETINCOME/ASSETS)-%DA is referred to as true performance excluding
the effects of earnings management.
3.4 Ownership structure
Take Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. as an example for identifying cash flow rights, control
rights and separation. The diagram of Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. in Fig. 1 illustrates
the complexity of computing cash flow and control rights separately when ownership
pyramids are present. Following the method in Claessens et at. (2000), voting rights
8
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were computed on the weakest link in the chain of shares owned by entities that are in
turn controlled by the ultimate owner 9 . Additionally, if there are two parallel
controlling chains connecting one firm and its controlling shareholders, the sum of the
weakest links in each of the chain of shares was measured as control rights. We
therefore calculated Huang Shaoliang’s control rights to be 14.57%, which equals the
weakest link in the chain of control through Xinwang Co., Xufei Co., Xudao Co.,
Guangcaihong Co. and Xufei Group Co. In contrast, the cash flow rights of Huang
Shaoliang in Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. was calculated to be 1.08%, which equals
14.57%*(32%*69.97%+29%*51%)*50%*40%.
(Insert Figure 1 here)
To examine the effect of separation in control and cash flow rights further, we divide
the sample according to whether controlling shareholders’ control rights exceed their
cash flow or ownership rights. We then compare the individual components of
separation, control and cash flow rights, and earnings management and firm
performance across the two sub-samples. The results are showed in Table 3. Control
rights exceeds cash flow rights in 1,425 firm-years and is equal to cash flow rights in
350 firm-years. Controlling shareholders in the two sub-sample control around 34%
and 30% of the firm’s voting rights, on average, respectively, but controlling
shareholders in firms with a separation only own 20% of the firm’s cash flow rights.
Therefore, the separation appears to be the result of maintaining control while
reducing cash flow rights. Moreover, 56.6% observations in firms with a separation
are low cash flow concentrated while only 23.4% observations in firms without a
separation are low cash flow concentrated. That is, separation in control and cash flow
rights is more attributable to lower cash flow rights. In addition, reported ROA and
earnings management are both lower for firms with a separation while true ROA
shows no difference in two sub-samples. Taken together, these results suggest that
controlling shareholders in firms with a separation are more likely to transfer
resources out of firm to their own benefits and thus their true performance do not
show much difference from their counterparts even though their reported ROA are
much higher.
(Insert Table 3 here)
9
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Table 4 presents values according to the ranges of cash flow rights. We divide our
sample to three different ranges when cash flow rights is less than or equal to 20%,
greater than 20% and less than or equal to 20%, and greater than 30%. Cash flow
rights is less than or equal to 20% for the majority of firms. For this group of firms,
reported ROA is only a little smaller than the other two sub-samples but their true
performance is the highest among three groups as well as the separation. Taken
together, the results in Table 3 and 4 suggest that stronger entrenchment effects of
separation in control and cash flow rights do not exist in lower cash flow concentrated
firms, on the contrary, the separation in lower cash flow concentrated firms even
shows positive effects on true firm performance.
(Insert Table 4 here)

3.5 Other variables
We include several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firmspecific characteristics that influence firm performance, for example, nature log of
board size. The nature log can mitigate the difference in board size across firms and
hence reduce heteroskedasticity. We also use nature log of assets for the same reason.
To examine our hypotheses in terms of board characteristics, we collect data on the
proportion of independent directors (BOARDIND), board size (LBOARDSIZE) and
CEO/Chair duality (DUAL).
Because free-riding problems among directors increase with board size (Jensen, 1993),
smaller boards are expected to be more effective monitors than large boards. However,
large boards are likely to be more effective monitors than small boards because they
are harder controlled by management and thus can more effectively protect
shareholders’ interests (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Most prior U.S. studies use two
proxies for board independence, the proportion of outside directors, and a dummy
variable showing whether the board has a majority of outside directors (Bedard et al,
2004). However, the percentage of independent directors on the board of China’s
listed firms is seldom greater than 50%, which is quite different from their U.S.
counterparts, therefore we only use the proportion of independent directors as proxy
for board independence.

Firm size is measured by nature log of assets (LASSETS). Prior literature has shown
that firm size is positively associated with firm performance significantly (for
example, Cornett et al., 2008). Thus, we use LASSETS as our proxy for firm size.
Leverage is also expected to play an important role in determining firm performance
in terms of the potential agency costs of debt (Iyengar et al, 2005). We therefore
include leverage rate (LEV) as control variable, which is measured as the book value
of debt to the book value of shareholders’ equity.
LOSS is used to measure a net loss for two consecutive years, which is considered to
be one determinant variable for earnings management (Chen et al., 2010).
Panel A of Table 2 represents the summary statistics of firm-specific characteristics.
On average, leverage is 1.43, and the average proportion of independent directors on
board is 59.7% when average number of directors serving on board is 6. 21.4% firms
in our sample have the same person sitting on both CEO and chairman of board
positions. Only 3% firms have net loss for prior two consecutive years.
4. Empirical results
We estimate two sets of regressions10. The first set investigates earnings management,
and treats the value of discretionary accruals divided by assets as the dependent
variable. The explanatory variables are corporate governance variables related to
ownership structure and firm-specific control variables. The second set of regressions
examines how firm performance relates to the same set of variables, both with and
without adjustment for earnings management.
4.1 Earnings management
Table 5 shows fixed effects results of the earnings management proxied by
discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are computed from the modified Jones
model, using Eq. 2 above. A fixed effects longitudinal regression model is used in our
study when the standard errors are reported in parentheses.
10

In contrast to Cornett et al. (2008), our study is based on a panel data set, which

mitigates a possible endogeneity problem by estimating fixed-effects models.

(Insert Table 5 here)
As shown by Table 5, column 2 shows the results of Eq.3. The coefficient on
SEPARATION is positively significantly associated with earning management,
supporting our expectation that the higher the control-cash flow rights separation the
higher the earnings management.
To further investigate if cash flow concentration can affect the relationship between
separation and earnings management, we divide the full sample to three different subsamples across different cash flow concentration (less than or equal to 20%, from
20%-30%, and greater than 30%, respectively) in columns 3, 4, and 5. The magnitude
of earnings management is only significantly negatively related with separation when
cash flow rights is high (greater than 30%). Consistent with our prediction, when both
the cash flow concentration and separation are high, the controlling shareholders will
have incentive and opportunity of managing earnings. In column 6, an interaction
term LCFC*SEPARATION is added to test the additional effect of low cash flow
concentration. The coefficients on LCFC*SEPARATION are -0.0037 at better than
5% significance. The results also support our expectation that high divergence
between control and cash flow rights can reduce earnings management when a firm
has low concentrated cash flow rights.
4.2 Firm performance
A potential issue is the potential endogeneity issue between ownership structure and
firm performance (Lins, 2003). By using Hausman test (1978), no serious endogeneity
issue is found in our models.
Table 6 and 7 indicate regression results of firm performance on ownership variables
and firm-specific variables. We use reported firm performance (ROA), net
income/assets, which can be referred to as unadjusted performance, as the dependent
variable in Table 6. The reported performance reflects managers’ discretionary
accounting treatments. Then we employ unmanaged (true) performance, which is
computed as the difference between ROA and %DA, as the dependent variable in
Table 7. The adjusted (true) performance is expected to exclude management
discretions.
(Insert Table 6 here)

In Table 6, separation and cash flow rights both significantly increase the reported
performance in model 1, and LCFC*SEPARATION decreases the reported
performance significantly while separation substantially increases it in model 5. Other
ownership variables do not show any significant relationship with reported
performance in all models.
(Insert Table 7 here)
Table 7 represents the regression results by using the same model as Table 6, but the
dependent variable is measured as the unmanaged (true) performance, ROA-%DA.
Even though separation significantly increases earnings management in model 1, it
has no significant relationship with true performance. In model 4, the coefficients on
SEPARATION is -0.0078 at better than 1% significance due to the substantial
increase in earnings management in Table 5. Likewise, after adjusting for the effects
of earnings management, the coefficients on LCFC*SEPARATION are positively
significantly related with true performance in model 5 while separation is negatively
associated with true performance.
4.3 Further tests
In order to examine the effects of disproportional ownership structures, we divide our
full sample to two sub-samples in Table 8, firms with pyramidal structures and firms
with other control-enhancing mechanisms. We can see from Table 8 that separation is
positively significantly associated with earnings management only in pyramids subsample. Moreover, after removing the effects of earnings management, separation
between control and cash flow rights reduces true performance significantly, which is
consistent with our expectation that the negative effects of separation is likely to be
stronger in firms with pyramidal structures.
(Insert Table 8 here)
To further examine the effects of cash flow rights concentration, we add a dummy
variable PYRAMID, which equals one when the firm is pyramidal structured and zero
otherwise, in our models. It can be seen from Table 9 that the coefficients on
PYRAMID is 0.02, significantly related with earnings management, and hence
significantly associated with true performance. Lower cash flow concentration is also
significantly related with earnings management while marginally significantly related

with true performance. Consistent with our prediction, the interaction item
LCFC*PYRAMID

reduces

earnings

management

significantly

and

hence

substantially increases the true performance, at better than 5% significance.
(Insert Table 9 here)
Prior studies used different measures of separation between control and cash flow
rights, for example, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2007) employed a dummy indicating that
control rights exceed cash flow rights. We also use separation dummy to rerun our
models as robustness test in model 6 of Table 5, 6 and 7. The results are mostly
consistent with our prior models.
Like the research of Claessens et al. (2002), the issue of reverse causality is not a
serious issue in our study because it is implausible that controlling shareholders
quickly change the cash flow and control structures of their corporations in response
to temporary change of firm performance.
5. Conclusions
Our analysis suggests that earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals)
responds dramatically to disproportional ownership. Earnings management is higher
when there is higher separation of control and cash flow rights. Earnings management
also increases in response to the pyramidal structures.
The results also suggest that the negative impact of separation on reported
profitability may have been covered by the effect of earnings management. As the
likely impact of earnings management is removed from profitability estimates, the
measured importance of disproportional ownership structure increases. Therefore, the
results suggest that a simple analysis on the relation between disproportional
ownership structure and operating performance can be problematic if we do not
consider earning management.
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Table 1 Definitions of variables
This table provides variable definitions used in the empirical analysis
Variable

Definition
Firm performance

ROA

The average roa, which is calculated as net income divided
by the book value of assets of the current year
Board characteristics

BOARDIND

Proportion of independent directors on board

LBOARDSIZE

Natural log of the total number of directors serving on the
board
Ownership structure

SEPARATION

Control rights less cash flow rights

CONTROL

The proportion of votes controlled by the largest shareholder
group

CASHRIGHT

The proportion of cash flow rights owned by the largest
shareholder group

DSEP

A dummy variable that equals one when separation is
positive and equals zero, otherwise

LCFC

A dummy variable that equals one when cash flow rights is
smaller than median cash flow rights of full sample and
equals zero, otherwise

PYRAMID

A dummy variable that equals one when the controlenhancing mechanisms are pyramids and equals zero,
otherwise
Firm-level control variables

LASSETS

Natural log of the book value of assetst-1

LEV

Leverage rate (debt/equity)

DUAL

A dummy variable that equals one when the chairman and
CEO positions are held by the same person and equals zero,
otherwise

LOSS
INDUSTRY

A dummy variable that equals one when the net income is
negative for the previous two years.
Dummy variables, 6 industries following Chen et al. (2006)

Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on ownership and firm-specific variables
Variable
Mean
Median Standard
deviation

25th
percentile

75th
Percentile

BOARDIND

0.5973

0.5

0.2195

0.5

0.6667

BOARDSIZE

5.7498

6

1.5298

5

6

SEPARATION

10.238

9.1292

8.9275

1.3562

16.9197

CONTROL

33.3822

29.85

14.2297

23.005

42.3

CASHRIGHT

23.1323

20.6656

14.7523

11.4724

31.2211

DSEP

0.778

1

0.4156

1

1

LCFC

0.4963

0

0.5001

0

1

PYRAMID

0.6901

1

0.4626

0

1

LASSETS

20.944

20.8742

0.8457

20.3734

21.4507

LEV

1.4328

0.9089

7.8998

0.4897

1.5544

DUAL

0.214

0

0.4102

0

0

LOSS

0.0302

0

0.1712

0

0

Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on accruals and average performance
Variable
Mean
Median Standard
deviation
ary _ accruals
%DA  DiscretionAssets

25th
percentile

75th
Percentile

0.014

0.0032

0.0961

-0.0334

0.0525

0.0642

0.042

0.0729

0.0176

0.0853

Reported:
ROA=net income/assets

0.0471

0.037

0.0431

0.0187

0.0648

True:
ROA-%DA

0.033

0.0364

0.0994

-0.011

0.0831

Reported:
ROA=net income/assets

0.0000

-0.0082

0.0413

-0.0253

0.0165

True:
ROA-%DA

-0.0000

0.0034

0.0983

-0.0437

0.0518

Abs(%DA)
Performance measures

Industry-adjusted performance

Financial statement data of family-controlled and individual-controlled publicly listed
Chinese firms are obtained from CSMAR database for each year, 2003-2009.
Following Chen et al. (2006), for each firm, I identify 6 industries. Industry-adjusted
performance is the firm’s net income in any year minus the average industry value for
that year. I measure firm performance alternatively as reported ROA, net
income/Assets, or performance adjusted for discretionary accruals as true firm
performance, net income/Assets-%DA. Normal discretionary accruals are computed
as Eq. (2). %DA (percentage discretionary accruals) are residuals between accrual
accruals and normal accruals as a fraction of assets defined by the modified Jones
model. Other variables definitions are given in Table 1.

Table 3. Comparison between family-controlled and individual-controlled firms with
or without a divergence in control and cash flow rights

Variables

DSEP=1
Mean
(Stand. Dev.)
N=1425

DSEP=0
Mean
(Stand. Dev.)
N=350

T-value for difference in means

ROA

0.0444
(0.0427)

0.058
(0.043)

-5.32***

%DA

0.0127
(0.2556)

0.0223
(0.0794)

-1.8*

ROA-%DA

0.0324
(0.1029)

0.0357
(0.0837)

-0.55

CONTROL

20.2861
(13.738)
33.8108
(14.0385)

30.4064
(13.544)
30.4067
(13.544)

LCFC

0.5656
(0.4959)

0.2343
(0.4109)

CASHRIGHT

-12.38***
4.09***
12.26***

Measures of reported firm performance, earnings management, true performance, and
ownership are presented separately for firms with or without a divergence in control and cash
flow rights. Variable definitions are given in Table 1.
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1.

Table 4. Reported firm performance, earnings management, true performance, and
ownership across different ranges of cash flow rights.

CASHRIGHT

ROA
%DA
Mean
Mean
Observations (Stand. Dev.) (Stand. Dev.)

ROA-%DA
Mean
(Stand. Dev.)

SEPARATION
Mean
(Stand. Dev.)

0-20%

0.0411
894 (0.0427)

0.0079
(0.089)

0.0332
(0.093)

13.8884
(8.4985)

20-30%

0.0484
436 (0.0433)

0.0155
(0.0892)

0.0329
(0.0903)

8.232
(9.2625)

>30%

0.0578
445 (0.0415)

0.0249
(0.114)

0.0329
(0.1186)

7.3427
(7.8164)

Averages of reported firm performance, earnings management, true firm performance,
and separation are presented for sample firms grouped according to levels of cash
flow rights. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Variable definitions are
given in Table 1.

Table 5. Regression analysis of earnings management on ownership variables
Discretionary accruals computed by performance-matched modified Jones model over 20032009. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals divided by assets, computed by Eq. 3.
Multivariate Tests
(Dependent variable=%DA)

Variables

Model 2 (Cash
flow
rights<=20%)

Model 1

Model 3
(20%<Cash
flow
rights<=30%)

Model 4
(Cash flow
rights>30%)

Model 5

Model 6

SEPARATION

0.0014**
(0.0006)

-0.0000 (0.001)

-0.0008
(0.0019)

0.0078***
(0.0026)

0.0045***
(0.0014)

CASHRIGHT

0.0006
(0.0004)

-0.0002 (0.0014)

-0.0015
(0.0028)

-0.001
(0.0016)

0.0002
(0.0006)

-0.0001
(0.0006)

LCFC

0.0169
(0.0197)

0.0144
(0.0242)

LCFC*SEPAR
ATION

-0.0037**
(0.0014)

DSEP

0.0415*
(0.0223)

DSEP*LCFC

-0.0433*
(0.0247)

BOARDIND

-0.0034
(0.002)

0.0058 (0.0276)

-0.0356
(0.0482)

0.0238
(0.0601)

-0.0054
(0.0199)

-0.0049
(0.02)

LBOARDSIZE

-0.006
(0.0195)

-0.0143 (0.0257)

0.01 (0.046)

-0.0004
(0.0594)

-0.0055
(0.0194)

-0.0068
(0.0195)

DUAL

0.008
(0.0102)

-0.002 (0.0144)

0.0091
(0.0237)

0.02
(0.0308)

0.0079
(0.0102)

0.0083
(0.0102)

LEV

-0.0098**
(0.005)

-0.0139**
(0.0065)

-0.0183
(0.0162)

-0.0003
(0.0162)

-0.009*
(0.005)

-0.009*
(0.0049)

LASSETS

0.0068
(0.0074)

-0.0017 (0.012)

-0.0024
(0.0189)

-0.0186
(0.0188)

0.0043
(0.0074)

0.0059
(0.0074)

LOSS

0.0944
(0.134)

-

-

-

0.0849
(0.134)

0.1085
(0.1634)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable

definitions are given in Table 1.

Table 6. Determinants of reported performance (ROA) in terms of ownership
variables.
Reported firm performance (ROA), net income/assets, which can be referred to as
unadjusted performance, is used as the dependent variable.
Multivariate Tests
(Dependent variable=ROA)

Variables

Model 1

Model 2 (Cash
flow
rights<=20%)

Model 3
(20%<Cash flow
rights<=30%)

Model 4
(Cash flow
rights>30%)

Model 5

Model 6

SEPARATION

0.0005**
(0.0002)

0.0005
(0.0004)

0.0000
(0.0007)

-0.0000
(0.0006)

0.0015***
(0.0005)

CASHRIGHT

0.0003**
(0.0001)

-0.0004
(0.0005)

-0.0004
(0.001)

-0.0007*
(0.0004)

0.0001
(0.0002)

0.0001
(0.0002)

LCFC

0.0042
(0.0067)

-0.0052
(0.0082)

LCFC*SEPARATION

-0.0012**
(0.0005)

DSEP

0.0105
(0.0075)

DSEP*LCFC

-0.0016
(0.0084)

BOARDIND

0.012*
(0.0067)

0.0165*
(0.01)

0.028* (0.0169)

-0.0056
(0.0134)

0.0113*
(0.0067)

0.0116*
(0.0067)

LBOARDSIZE

-0.0001
(0.0066)

0.0021
(0.0094)

-0.0072
(0.0161)

-0.0272**
(0.0132)

0.0000
(0.0066)

0.0000
(0.0066)

DUAL

0.0017
(0.0035)

0.0008
(0.0053)

-0.0037
(0.0083)

-0.0045
(0.0068)

0.0017
(0.0034)

0.0018
(0.0035)

LEV

-0.0121***
(0.0017)

-0.0097***
(0.0023)

-0.0225***
(0.0057)

-0.0074**
(0.0036)

-0.0118***
(0.0017)

-0.0118***
(0.0017)

LASSETS

0.0035
(0.0025)

0.0021
(0.0044)

0.0028

-0.0057
(0.0042)

0.0026
(0.0025)

0.0033
(0.0025)

LOSS

-0.0541
(0.0453)

-

-

-

-0.0566
(0.0453)

-0.0509
(0.0552)

(0.0066)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable

definitions are given in Table 1.

Table 7. Determinants of true firm performance (PERF) in terms of ownership
variables.
The dependent variable is measured as the true performance, net income/assets-%DA.
Multivariate Tests

Variables

(Dependent variable=ROA-%DA)
Model 3
Model 2 (Cash
(20%<Cash
flow
flow
Model 1
rights<=20%)
rights<=30%)

Model 4
(Cash flow
rights>30%)

Model 5

Model 6

SEPARATION

-0.001
(0.0006)

0.0006 (0.001)

0.0008
(0.0019)

-0.0078***
(0.0026)

-0.003**
(0.0013)

CASHRIGHT

-0.0003
(0.0004)

-0.0002
(0.0014)

0.0011
(0.0028)

0.0003
(0.0016)

-0.0000
(0.0006)

0.0002
(0.0006)

LCFC

-0.0127
(0.0198)

-0.0196
(0.0242)

LCFC*SEPARATION

0.0025*
(0.0014)

DSEP

-0.031
(0.0223)

DSEP*LCFC

0.0417*
(0.0247)

BOARDIND

0.0154
(0.02)

0.0108
(0.0277)

0.0637
(0.0468)

-0.0294
(0.0597)

0.0167
(0.02)

0.0165
(0.02)

LBOARDSIZE

0.0059
(0.0195)

0.0164 (0.0259)

-0.0171
(0.0447)

-0.0268
(0.059)

0.0055
(0.0195)

0.0069
(0.0195)

DUAL

-0.0063
(0.0102)

0.0028
(0.0145)

-0.0128
(0.023)

-0.0245
(0.0306)

-0.0062
(0.0102)

-0.0065
(0.0102)

LEV

-0.0023
(0.005)

0.0043
(0.0065)

-0.0042
(0.0157)

-0.0072
(0.0161)

-0.0028
(0.005)

-0.0028
(0.0049)

LASSETS

-0.0033
(0.0074)

0.0038 (0.012)

0.0052
(0.0184)

0.0129
(0.0187)

-0.0017
(0.0075)

-0.0025
(0.0074)

LOSS

-0.1485
(0.1341)

-

-

-

-0.1415
(0.1344)

-0.1594
(0.1345)

***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable

definitions are given in Table 1.

Table 8. Determinants of reported firm performance, earnings management, and true
firm performance (PERF) in terms of control-enhancing mechanisms: pyramids and
other ownership disproportional.
Control-enhancing mechanisms
PYRAMIDS

Variables

Dependent
variable=net
income/assets

%DA

Dependent
variable=ROA%DA

Dependent
variable=net
income/assets

OTHERS

%DA

Dependent
variable=ROA%DA

SEPARATION

0.0003
(0.0003)

0.00019** -0.0015*
(0.0008)
(0.0008)

0.0000
(0.0006)

0.0011
(0.0004)

-0.0011
(0.0014)

CASHRIGHT

0.0005***
(0.0002)

0.0009
(0.0006)

-0.0005
(0.0006)

-0.0000
(0.0003)

-0.0002
(0.0008)

0.0002
(0.0008)

BOARDIND

0.0122
(0.0076)

0.0103
(0.0246)

0.0019
(0.0246)

-0.001
(0.0147)

-0.0377
(0.0362)

0.0368
(0.036)

DUAL

0.0086
(0.0073)
-0.0031
(0.0041)

-0.0021
(0.0236)
0.0029
(0.0131)

0.0108
(0.0236)
-0.006
(0.0131)

-0.0289*
(0.0151)
0.0152**
(0.0073)

-0.0201
(0.0371)
0.0076
(0.0179)

-0.0087
(0.037)
0.0076
(0.0179)

LEV

-0.0113***
(0.0017)

-0.0101*
(0.0056)

-0.0012
(0.0056)

-0.014**
(0.0057)

-0.0111
(0.014)

-0.0028
(0.0139)

LASSETS

0.0019
(0.0029)

0.0034
(0.0092)

-0.0015
(0.0092)

0.0035
(0.0059)

0.0309** -0.0274*
(0.0145) (0.0145)

LBOARDSIZE

LOSS

-0.0533
0.0987
-0.152
-0.1415
-0.1594
(0.0427)
(0.1375)
(0.1377)
(0.1344) (0.1345)
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable

definitions are given in Table 1.

Table 9. Determinants of reported firm performance, earnings management, and true
firm performance (PERF) in terms of control-enhancing mechanisms, pyramid
dummy.

Variables

Dependent
variable=net
income/assets

%DA

Dependent
variable=ROA-%DA

CASHRIGHT

0.0002
(0.0001)

0.0006*
(0.0003)

-0.0003
(0.0003)

PYRAMID

-0.0059
(0.0044)

0.0231**
(0.0095)

-0.0277***
(0.0104)

LCFC

-0.006
(0.0049)

0.0222**
(0.011)

-0.0225*
(0.0119)

PYRAMID*LCFC

-0.0016
(0.0051)

-0.032***
(0.0113)

0.026**
(0.0122)

BOARDIND

0.0125**
(0.0056)

-0.0031
(0.0039)

0.0157
(0.0146)

DUAL

-0.0017
(0.0049)
0.0016
(0.0026)

-0.0027
(0.0108)
0.0004
(0.0059)

0.0005
(0.0118)
-0.0011
(0.0063)

LEV

-0.0131***
(0.0012)

-0.0022
(0.0026)

-0.0111***
(0.0028)

LASSETS

0.0017
(0.0015)

0.0034
(0.0029)

-0.0014
(0.0033)

LBOARDSIZE

-0.0618*
-0.0126
-0.0647
LOSS
(0.0322)
(0.096)
(0.0986)
***:P<0.01, **:P<0.05, *: P<0.1. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. Variable

definitions are given in Table 1.

Figure 1. Xiamen Haoshiguang Co. example.
Source: Data obtained from company prospectuses. The arrow indicates the direction of
control.
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